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177 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF LOUIS BRANDEIS TO THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING 
John S. Dzienkowski 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much scholarship has been written about the U.S. Senate 
debate pertaining to the conduct of Louis D. Brandeis as a lawyer and 
whether he represented conflicting interests in violation of the rules 
of ethics.1  The overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the 
opponents of Louis Brandeis sought to find any possible reason to 
object to his candidacy because of their antisemitism and their 
objection to Brandeis’ economic policies.2  In this essay, I examine 
 
Professor of Law & Dean John F. Sutton, Jr. Chair in Lawyering and the Legal Process, The 
University of Texas at Austin.  I extend my gratitude to Professor Samuel J. Levine and the 
entire Touro Law Center community for hosting a superb conference on the life of Louis 
Brandeis. I thank Robert Peroni for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58 (1978) 
[hereinafter HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW]; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 
(1st ed. 2009); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 
(1965); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation]; Katherine A. Helm, What Justice Brandeis 
Taught Us About Conflicts of Interest, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 (2010); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive 
Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445 (1996). 
2 See THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND 
THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1st ed. 1978). As I described in an 
earlier article,  
The climate surrounding the nomination was very turbulent.  One 
Senator later described the debate as follows: 
When his nomination for Justice of the Supreme Court came up for 
confirmation in the Senate, one of the bitterest fights that was ever 
waged in that body took place.  In those days, action of the Senate on 
confirmation was held in executive session; but some of the leading 
statesmen of the day, some of the ablest men in that parliamentarian 
body, made a bitter, unreasonable, and unconscionable attack upon this 
man.  Some of these men were moved into action because of Justice 
Brandeis’ religion; but I have always thought the great bulk of this 
opposition, that which was the most powerful and made the greatest 
effort to defeat his confirmation, came from a combination of financial 
1
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the effect that the debate about the ethics of a distinguished lawyer 
and jurist had upon the law of lawyering.   
My thesis is that the use of an ethical argument to oppose a 
Supreme Court nomination exposed the weaknesses in the ethics 
codes and highlighted the importance of anticipating future 
challenges of lawyering while conducting the practice of law.  This 
debate took place on a national stage in which third parties sought to 
use ethics rules to demonstrate the unfitness of a lawyer to serve on 
the United States Supreme Court.3  The debate attempted to 
legitimize opposition to a Supreme Court nominee and develop third-
party standing to raise conflicts of interests to disqualify a nominee.4  
The conduct in question involved non-litigation representation.5  This 
was one of the first examinations into ethics outside of the advocacy 
setting.6  This controversy highlighted the difficulties of drafting 
ethics codes in the context of non-litigation lawyering.7  In addition, 
the disagreement introduced to the legal profession and the nation as 
a whole, the notion of what role ethics should play in assessing a 
 
interests which wanted to punish an able man who had often thwarted 
them in their evil ways, and who feared, if he were given this great place 
of honor, he might still frustrate their efforts to acquire, by questionable 
means, greater financial power. 
John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in 
the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 749 n.43 (1992) [hereinafter 
Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries], quoting George W. Norris, Address in the 
Memory of Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. xxi, xxii (1943). 
3 See Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary U.S. S., on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the U.S., 64th Cong. 277-79 (1916), reprinted in 1 THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS 1916-1975 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein 
comps., Buffalo, Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1977) [hereinafter 1 Hearings]; Nomination of Louis 
D. Brandeis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., on the 
Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 
64th Cong. 277-79 (1916), reprinted in 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NOMINATIONS 1916-1975 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein comps., Buffalo, Wm. S. 
Hein & Co. 1977) [hereinafter 2 Hearings]; Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., on the Nomination of Louis D. 
Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 64th Cong. 277-79 
(1916), reprinted in 3 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS 1916-1975 
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein comps., Buffalo, Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1977) 
[hereinafter 3 Hearings]. 
4 Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation, supra note 1, at 377. 
5 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298.  
6 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 58-60. 
7 Helm, supra note 1, at 10, 15. 
2
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lawyer’s fitness when under consideration for a judicial position.8  
The opposing side countered by suggesting that Brandeis likely had a 
broader view of lawyering in mind when he represented multiple 
parties.9  In my opinion, this debate over the ethics of Louis Brandeis 
contributed to the importance of developing the rules of ethics and in 
demonstrating the different views of lawyering in the legal 
profession. 
II.  HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 
A transformation occurred during the late 1800s and early 
1900s in the practice of lawyering.  The day-to-day work of lawyers 
shifted from advocacy work to transactional practice as the client 
base increasingly moved into the Industrial Revolution.10  During this 
time, the legal profession was undergoing a transformation in terms 
of substantive law.11  In addition, there was also a transformation in 
determining how the ethical standards would be applied in a non-
advocacy setting when lawyers were called upon to provide advice to 
the nation’s corporations.12  Lawyers were called upon to apply ethics 
and conflicts rules developed primarily in the advocacy context to 
non-litigation practice—areas of lawyering which were largely 
undeveloped.13  This is the setting in which Brandeis practiced law in 
a major business center in the country.14   
The conduct of Louis Brandeis that was subject to the Senate 
hearings involved: (1) transactional work for a family; (2) debtor-
creditor work for a company in financial distress; (3) labor law work 
to resolve a dispute between labor and management; and (4) lobbying 
before a legislature to support public law reform that affected the 
anticompetitive business practices of a former client.15  Many of these 
representations occurred before the American Bar Association 
 
8 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 57-59. 
9 Helm, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
10 Robert T. Swaine, The Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics 
of the Modern Bar, 35 AM. BAR ASS’N 89, 91 (1949).  See also Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ 
Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
1, 6 (1999).  
11 Carle, supra note 10, at 7. 
12 Carle, supra note 10, at 20. 
13 Swaine, supra note 10, at 91. 
14 Helm, supra note 1, at 5. 
15 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298.  
3
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(“ABA”) promulgated the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, and 
most of them before Massachusetts adopted its code of conduct for 
lawyers.16  
Apart from the lack of established standards to judge the 
conduct of lawyers, two allegations, (1) unethical conduct because he 
represented conflicting interests, and (2) not adequately informing his 
clients that their interests were in conflict, during the time of the 
hearings were illustrative of the debate over the conduct of 
Brandeis.17  In defending Brandeis, his supporters provided evidence 
that many other lawyers represented clients in similar contexts with 
verbal disclosures during that time.18  The critics exaggerated when 
they accused Brandeis of clear, unethical behavior and many of the 
complaints relied upon the disclosures (or lack thereof) that Brandeis 
made to his clients before he undertook the conflicting 
representations.19  Full disclosure was required, but at that time it was 
difficult to prove exactly what information and warnings Louis 
Brandeis gave the parties to the transactions.20     
The opponents of Brandeis crafted their arguments in an 
attempt to demonstrate that Brandeis acted in an unethical manner in 
his practice of law.21  The use of ethics to challenge a person’s 
competence to serve as a justice on the United States Supreme Court 
relied on a perception that unethical behavior accompanies 
dishonesty and incompetence.22  Even today, a charge that a lawyer 
behaved unethically causes an individual to conclude that such 
lawyer is untrustworthy.23  Countering unethical behavior charges 
was difficult outside of the context of the representation because the 
process to defend against such charges would require disclosure of 
confidential information.24  The arguments that labeled Brandeis as 
 
16 Canons of Professional Ethics, MASS. L.Q., Nov. 1915, at 1, 1 (adopting the ABA 
Canons in 1915); Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).  
17 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61. 
18 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61 (comparing Brandeis’ conduct to “other 
reputable lawyers that . . . had often done exactly as Brandeis.”). 
19 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61. 
20 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61. 
21 Frank, supra note 1, at 707. 
22 Frank, supra note 1, at 685. 
23 See generally Frank, supra note 1.   
24 At the time, the Canons of Professional Ethics did not contain an exception to the 
confidentiality obligation authorizing a lawyer to disclose confidential information in order 
4
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unethical inevitably elevated the tenor of the debate, and thus 
attracted the attention of all the participants 25  Understandably, the 
members of the Senate were hesitant to openly vocalize support for a 
candidate of the highest Federal court in the United States if the 
candidate’s conduct was viewed to violate the norms of ethics. 
III.  DEFENDING BRANDEIS’ CONDUCT AGAINST CHARGES OF 
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
The defense of Louis Brandeis highlighted many important 
lessons for the law of lawyering.  At this time, candidates for the 
Supreme Court did not personally testify before the Senate.26  
Instead, their supporters would present evidence in favor of the 
candidate and offer defenses to particular attacks.27  The absence of 
direct testimony from Louis Brandeis adds to the mystery of what 
Brandeis sought to do in his lawyering, but it also highlighted to a 
broader audience the difficulty of applying rules of conduct to 
transactional lawyering.28   
A defense of a lawyer’s conduct in representing a client 
places the lawyer in a difficult position because it often requires the 
disclosure of confidential information, which is sometimes 
information adverse to the client, but is needed to establish the 
defense.29  In most situations, the clients are former clients and in 
some cases no longer living.30  The presentation of evidence by the 
accused lawyer is complicated and in situations in which the 
allegations are vague, the defense may be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to present. The nature of lawyering in an attorney-client 
setting involves a fluid relationship that depends upon significant 
 
to defend the lawyer’s conduct.  However, the Model Rules contain such an explicit 
exception now. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6(b)(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015).   
25 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 450-51. 
26 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 443. 
27 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 443-44.  Brandeis’ law partner, Edward McClennen, 
managed the responses in favor of Brandeis during the confirmation hearings. UROFSKY, 
supra note 1, at 445.   
28 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 444. 
29 See John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57-58 (2013) [hereinafter Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking]. 
30 Legal Profession Prof, Client Interests Live on for Conflict Purposes, LEGAL PROF. 
BLOG (July 30, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2010/07/client-
interests-live-on-for-conflicts-purposes.html. 
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interaction between a lawyer and the client that is difficult to 
replicate to properly defend the lawyer’s conduct. 
When an individual contends that a judicial candidate is 
unethical because he or she was involved in a conflict of interest, the 
link between ethical lawyering and judicial fitness comes into 
focus.31  Does a lawyer who represents conflicting interests and does 
not properly disclose the conflict and obtain client consent appear 
less competent to handle cases?  Or is the person focused on the 
profit motive from the legal fees to the disregard of the clients’ 
interests more competent to handle cases?  The attacks grounded in 
conflict of interest allegations allowed the opponents of Brandeis to 
tarnish the legal career of a distinguished practitioner.32 
The inclusion of a significant number of witnesses in the 
hearings sent a powerful message to lawyers throughout the 
country.33  It elevated the subject of professional responsibility to a 
level of importance at a time when the profession was struggling with 
its newly enacted code of conduct.34  As the ABA sought to adopt a 
modern view of the concept of a profession, individual lawyers 
representing corporations and business individuals saw the dangers 
inherent in their craft.35  
These charges illustrated a tension between client demands 
and lawyer services, and thus highlighted that lawyers should be 
mindful of conflicts and other compromising situations when 
deciding whether to accept a representation.36  The Senate hearings 
led some prominent lawyers, such as John Frank, to opine that 
lawyers should never represent multiple clients as a situation.37  Such 
 
31 Helm, supra note 1, at 4. 
32 Helm, supra note 1, at 4. 
33 Katherine Helm’s description of the proceedings paints a powerful picture as to nature 
of the hearings. Helm, supra note 1, at 3-4 (describing the four month hearing as taking on a 
life of its own). 
34 Helm, supra note 1, at 19. 
35 Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preface, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html (last visited Nov. 
6, 2016).  The ABA and the legal profession at the time of the Brandeis hearings sought to 
establish its control over regulating lawyers through control of entry, discipline, and conduct. 
Helm, supra note 1, at 19. 
36 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
37 Frank, supra note 1, at 698. The term, “situation” was offered as a defense to the 
conflicts of interest charges.  Brandeis supposedly undertook a representation of the situation 
whether it was a family transaction or dispute or a corporate debt crisis.  By representing the 
6
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advice highlighted the dangers of examining a professional’s work 
for the purpose of determining whether it complied with ethical 
norms. 
 The inquiry into the ethics of Louis Brandeis also 
demonstrated the need for documented evidence of disclosures and 
consents from clients and third parties.  As lawyers began to 
represent the business interests that grew out of the Industrial 
Revolution, they needed to be mindful that their conduct could be 
scrutinized years later.38  With the difficulty of establishing a defense 
to a lawyer’s decisions, lawyers needed to document their decisions 
with internal notes in the file, along with express client consents.39  
Such documentary proof of contemporaneous consideration of the 
ethical issues would provide significant contemporaneous proof for a 
lawyer’s actions.40  The defense of Brandeis lacked such proof and 
the hearings demonstrated the wisdom of having such evidence in the 
future.41 
The hearings also illustrated the notion that the success of the 
role of a lawyer as a problem-solver often determines whether the 
lawyer’s decisions on conflicts of interests would be subject to 
scrutiny.42  If the lawyer’s conduct leads to a successful solution in a 
multiple client representation, few will argue that the lawyer erred in 
accepting the representation.  However, if the representation fails in 
forming the transaction or resolving the dispute, the lawyer’s conduct 
in accepting the representation takes a center stage.  The allegations 
made against Brandeis involved representations that did not lead to a 
successful resolution of the business and legal problem.  The analysis 
under the codes of ethics should be identical in both of these 
 
situation, Brandeis sought to address the problem for the interests of all involved rather than 
represent any one of the individual clients. 
38 Harrison Barnes, The Industrialization of the Law Firm, BCG ATTORNEY SEARCH, 
http://www.bcgsearch.com/article/60634/The-industrialization-of-law-firm/ (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2016). 
39 Theresa M. Gronkiewicz, Twelve Tips to Help You Avoid Disciplinary Proceedings, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (2013),  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/12_
tips_avoid_disciplinary_proceedings_scpd_2013.authcheckdam.pdf.   
40 Id.  
41 David G. Dalin, The Appointment of Louis D. Brandeis, First Jewish Justice on the 
Supreme Court, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 100: THEN & NOW 1-2, 4, 
http://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/31435/LDB100Dalin.pdf?sequence=1 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
42 Frank, supra note 1, at 698. 
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situations; however, the reality of failed legal representation places 
the lawyer at an enhanced risk.  
IV.  THE INADEQUACY OF THE 1908 CANONS TO JUDGE 
CONDUCT OF LAWYERS 
On a mission to become a national organization that is 
prominent in self-regulation of the legal profession,43 the ABA 
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons) in 1908.44  One 
would think that a confirmation hearing taking place in 1916 would 
allow the participants in the hearing to examine the 1908 Canons in 
order to determine if the concepts contained in the code should have 
guided the conduct of Louis Brandeis.  However, the hearing did not 
go as one would have hoped.  
In 1908, the ABA adopted thirty-two of the Canons.45  
Canons 33 through 45 were adopted in 1928.46  Of the original 
Canons, eighteen were intended to guide lawyers in litigation.47  
Arguably, only one rule addressed the situations that Louis Brandeis 
encountered: Canon 6, which focused on the topic of “Adverse 
Influences and Conflicting Interests.”48  Under Canon 6, lawyers are 
obligated to inform every prospective client of any relation, interest, 
or connection to the parties or the facts of the representation.49  
Additionally, lawyers may not represent conflicting interests, “except 
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the 
facts.”50   
If one were to follow the requirements of Canon 6, the sole 
question of Brandeis’ representations would be whether he properly 
disclosed the conflicts to all of the clients, and whether he properly 
obtained their consent.  But, the opponents argued that Brandeis 
 
43 See generally Richard L. Abel, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989). 
44 See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2395, 2395 (2003).   
45 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS n.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckd
am.pdf   
46 Id. at n.8. 
47 Id. at Canons 1, 3, 8, 10, 13 n.4, 17-25, 28 n.6, 31 n.7 (explaining Canon 13 was 
amended in 1933, Canon 28 was amended in 1928, and Canon 31 was amended in 1937). 
48 Id. at Canon 6. 
49 Id. 
50 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 45, at Canon 6.  
8
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never should have accepted the representations in the first place.51  
Thus, they were imposing a higher standard upon Brandeis in 
transactional matters than was contemplated through the guidance of 
Canon 6. 
Scholars have argued that the drafters of the 1908 Canons 
were not as concerned with conflicts of interest because they sought 
to promote client autonomy. This rationale could explain the 
inclusion of only one canon to guide lawyer conduct.52  However, this 
would support the view that Brandeis’ conduct was consistent with 
the existing norms at the time.  And, if the profession sought to 
impose a higher standard for conflicts of interest, it was the 
obligation of the drafters to detail how a lawyer should act in 
particular situations.    
Subsequent amendments to the Canons included several 
provisions that arguably have bearing upon the type of conduct that 
was under examination in the confirmation hearings.53  Canon 35 
(Intermediaries), Canon 37 (Confidences of a Client) and Canon 44 
(Withdrawal from Employment as Attorney or Counsel) could have 
been used by lawyers in similar situations.54  However, one might 
suspect that the Brandeis confirmation hearings accentuated the 
divide in the profession as to how lawyers should draft the ethical 
codes.55 
In the decades following the Brandeis confirmation hearings, 
the ruling members of the ABA realized that the Canons of 
Professional Ethics were insufficient to regulate the conduct of 
lawyers in the American legal profession.56  One group sought to 
draft the codes in terms of broad aspirational guidelines and another 
group sought more concrete guidance and clarity in the specific 
provisions.57  Less than a decade after the confirmation of Louis 
Brandeis, the ABA leadership appointed a committee to revise the 
 
51 Helm, supra note 1, at 7.   
52 Altman, supra note 44, at 2472-74 (2003) (noting that the autonomy contained in the 
canons was consistent with Brandeis’ views of independence and autonomy towards 
lawyering described by Clyde Spillenger in his Yale article).  
53 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
54 Id. at Canon 35, 37, 44. 
55 Helm, supra note 1, at 9. 
56 Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking, supra note 29, at 63.  
57 Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking, supra note 29, at 61-63.  
9
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Canons of Professional Ethics.58  Four efforts to revise the Canons 
failed because of this schism in the ABA leadership.59  I suggest that 
the Brandeis confirmation hearings had a significant influence on the 
debate and the arguments illustrated how reasonable minds differed 
as to the proper approach to drafting codes to regulate lawyer 
conduct.  In 1964, Reporter John F. Sutton, Jr. proposed a 
compromise that included Canons, Ethical Considerations, and 
Disciplinary Rules.60  This approach gave each group something in 
the new Model Code of Professional Responsibility.61      
V.  THE OPEN ENDED NATURE OF CONFLICTS ALLEGATIONS IN 
LAWYERING 
The opponents to the confirmation of Louis Brandeis brought 
twelve allegations against his conduct in the practice of law.62  The 
core of most of these allegations involved a conflict of interest.63  
Until the Industrial Revolution, conflicts of interest had been 
examined primarily in the context of litigation representations.64  
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted a rather basic 
view of conflicts of interest.65  First, at the outset when a prospective 
client is deciding whether to retain a particular lawyer, the lawyer is 
required “at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the 
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or 
connection with the controversy . . . .”66  The absolute duty to 
disclose all information to the parties placed a significant burden 
 
58 Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 
24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970). 
59 Id. at 3-5 (describing the four efforts to revise the Canons). 
60 See John F. Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser’s 
Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 134 (1966) (viewing that the Code needed aspirational 
standards that set forth core principles); See id. at 137-39 (believing that a code for 
regulating lawyers needed more than just bright-line rules).  
61 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969); see generally, John F. 
Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An 
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970) (discussing the history of the 1969 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility). 
62 See Frank, supra note 1, at 685 (examining all of the charges brought against Brandeis). 
63 See Frank, supra note 1, at 692, 694.  
64 See Swaine, supra note 10, at 89, 171(explaining the evolution of lawyering during the 
industrialization period in America).  
65 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
66 Id. 
10
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upon the lawyer.67  Second, Canon 6 prohibits lawyers from 
representing conflicting interests “except by express consent of all 
concerned given after a full disclosure of all the facts.”68  Finally, 
Canon 6 attempts to define the prohibition against conflicts of interest 
as a duty to represent clients with “undivided loyalty and not to 
divulge his secrets or confidences” because of loyalties undertaken to 
represent a new client.69  An examination of two allegations made 
against Brandeis presented open-ended conflict of interest questions 
for the lawyer.70   
In the Lennox bankruptcy representation, the creditors of 
Lennox sought to hire Brandeis to help resolve a crisis in the 
financial situation of the company.71  Brandeis accepted the matter 
because he was convinced by his clients that the creditor and debtor 
had a common interest to work out the crisis.72  Apparently, Brandeis 
did not clarify whether he represented the Lennox Company or Mr. 
Lennox, and, if he did represent them, whether there was a limitation 
on the scope of the representation.73  After examining the situation, 
Brandeis concluded that a work out of the financial crisis was not 
possible, and, therefore, he urged the company to transfer assets to a 





70 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 1, at 694-98, 697 n.44, 700-02; Helm, supra note 1, at 5-6, 
9, 11. 
71 Frank, supra note 1, at 699-700; Spillenger, supra note 1, at 1505. 
72 Morris Weisman, Brandeis and the Lennox Case, 47 COM. L.J. 36, 38 (1942). The 
allegations, however sought to ascribe a financial motive for accepting the representations:  
That he took employment from a client, advised him to make an 
assignment for the benefit of his creditors, had his own partner appointed 
the assignee and afterwards denied that he had ever been employed by 
the client.  That at the time he took the employment and gave the advice 
he was the attorney of one of the largest creditors of the client and for 
whose benefit the assignment was made, and in connection with the 
question whether the assignment should be made or not, was advising 
another of the large creditors.  That he later repudiated his employment 
by his client and prosecuted a petition in bankruptcy against him 
alleging, as an act of bankruptcy, the making of the assignment that he 
himself had advised him to make.  Out of this course of conduct he made 
for himself and his firm fees amounting to $43,852. 
3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298. 
73 Frank, supra note 1, at 700 (explaining the case by pointing out that Lennox could not 
have reasonably viewed Brandeis as representing his interests while also indicating that 
Lennox sought to conceal assets and Brandeis would not let him do so). 
74 Frank, supra note 1, at 699-700. 
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entered bankruptcy.75  The core of the complaint against Brandeis 
was that he represented conflicting interests in seeking to work out 
the financial crisis.76  In defense of Brandeis, the law of representing 
unintended clients when a lawyer commenced a multiple client 
representation was not well developed.77  And, one could argue that 
his exploratory work on the financial situation did not rise to the level 
of representing the Lennox interests.78   
In another matter involving an ethics allegation against 
Brandeis, the Warren trust representation, he represented the Warren 
Company, a paper mill that was owned by the family of a law 
partner.79  Brandeis helped place the assets of the family into a trust 
and then proceeded to lease out some of the property to several 
family members.80  When a lawsuit arose to invalidate the lease, 
Brandeis defended the lease in the lawsuit on behalf of the lessees.81  
Eventually, the case was dropped and other members of the family 
bought out the beneficiary.82  The core of the complaint against 
Brandeis was that he should have declined to prepare a lease of the 
property from the family trust to family members, and also should 
have declined to represent the beneficiary in seeking to uphold the 
lease.83  At that time, Brandeis viewed his representation broadly as 
including the family, and also including the trust and the members of 
the trust.84  The ethical rules of lawyering at the time did not provide 
guidance for lawyers who were confronted with the situation that 
Brandeis faced.85   
 
75 Frank, supra note 1, at 700. 
76 Frank, supra note 1, at 700.  Such a claim would only be valid if Brandeis had 
undertaken a representation of both creditor and debtor. Id. at 701. 
77 Frank, supra note 1, at 701-02; Spillenger, supra note 1, at 1488-89. 
78 Although this is a plausible explanation, today a lawyer in a similar situation or case 
would be sure to warn the non-client in a writing that the lawyer did not represent the non-
client’s interests.  This would have prevented Lennox from later claiming that Brandeis was 
representing his interests.  Frank, supra note 1, at 702. 
79 Frank, supra note 1, at 694. 
80 Frank, supra note 1, at 694. 
81 Frank, supra note 1, at 694-95. 
82 Frank, supra note 1, at 695. 
83 Frank, supra note 1, at 695; 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298-99 (quoting “[t]hat he for 
a long time represented and collected fees from two clients whose interests were 
diametrically opposed to each other and when they, later, went to law over those same 
conflicting interests he took employment for one of them against the other”). 
84 Frank, supra note 1, at 694-96. 
85 Frank, supra note 1, at 697-98. 
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The Senate hearings on the various transactions illustrated 
how difficult it is to guide lawyers on specific conflicts of interest.86  
The language of Canon 6 is too absolute and without much subtle 
nuance.87  No lawyer in practice can avoid all conflicts of interest.  
The rules must identify conflicts that rise to the level of requiring 
client consent and should identify the manner in which lawyers must 
analyze those conflicts.  Subsequent developments in the Model Code 
and the Model Rules improved upon this guidance in the rules of 
professional responsibility.88  Correspondingly, the drafters of these 
codes of conduct were clearly aware of the questions that were raised 
in the Brandeis hearings and they sought to address lawyering in the 
transaction context.89 
VI.  DIFFERENT VIEWS OF BRANDEIS’ CONCEPTION OF 
LAWYERING FOR MULTIPLE CLIENTS 
The impact Louis Brandeis had upon the modern day ethical 
rules requires an examination of his multiple client representations.  
A number of scholars have examined the different representations 
that raised ethical concerns and the justifications offered by the 
supporters during the Louis Brandeis hearings for Justice of the 
Supreme Court.90  It is important to remember Brandeis himself never 
 
86 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 277-79. 
87 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 45, at Canon 6. 
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1982).  
89 Alysa C. Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family 
Business: The Lawyer as Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 578 (1998) (quoting “In 1983, in 
large part due to the efforts of Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter to the Kutak Commission, which 
was responsible for drafting the Model Rules, the American Bar Association incorporated 
Brandeis’s concept of ‘lawyer for the situation’ into Model Rule 2.2.”). 
90 See, e.g., Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 755-57.  As 
Professor Hazard described,  
      The transactions complained of included the following: First, 
Brandeis had at one time represented one party in a transaction, [then] 
later represented someone else in a way that impinged on that 
transaction.  Second, he had acted in situations where those he served 
had conflicting interests, for example by putting together the bargain 
between parties to a business deal.  Third, he had acted for a family 
business and continued so to act after a falling out among the family 
required reorganization of the business arrangement.  Fourth, over a 
course of several years he had mediated and adjusted interests of the 
owners and creditors of a business in such a way as to keep the business 
from foundering. 
HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 60.  
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confirmed or rejected these defenses.91  However, these defenses 
continue to occupy a prominent role in the jurisprudence of Brandeis’ 
concept of lawyering for multiple clients. 
John Frank, a leading lawyer, viewed the Brandeis conduct 
regarding the representation of multiple clients to reflect a lawyer 
who sought to solve client problems and yield to client pressures.92  
In no uncertain terms, Frank viewed this approach of representing 
multiple clients too dangerous and would allow for individuals to 
second guess the lawyer’s role in the matter.93  No matter how 
tempting, lawyers should never act as “counsel for a situation” 
because the risks are too high.94   
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Thomas Shaffer adopted a 
romanticized view of Brandeis’ lawyering for multiple clients.95  
Hazard was attracted by the notion that clients often want to have one 
lawyer represent all of their interests.96  In many cases this 
perspective on lawyering produces the best result for all of the 
clients.  Hazard first wrote about this in his book, Ethics in the 
Practice of Law, but later implemented this type of lawyering in 
Model Rule 2.2, the Lawyer as Intermediary.97  The basic notion was 
that lawyers can represent the best interests of all of the parties in 
seeking to create a transaction or resolve a dispute.98  If the effort 
fails, each of the parties can hire independent lawyers to represent 
their interests.99  Professor Thomas Shaffer relied upon his religious 
teachings to view lawyering in the family context as perfect for 
 
91 Morris Weisman, supra note 72, at 37. 
      During the investigation of his record and character, and throughout 
the attack, Brandeis made no effort to defend himself.  Not a single word 
of complaint came from him.  Certain that he was free of legal or moral 
wrong, he waited in silence, with sorrow in his heart for his traducers.  In 
him were deep wells of courage, the product of highest morality and 
intellectual loftiness, of a rigid self-imposed discipline, and restraint.  
For such a man to be charged with the breach of the most sacred canon 
of professional ethics, disloyalty to a client, for a few pieces of silver, 
was irony indeed. 
Morris Weisman, supra note 72, at 37.  
92 Frank, supra note 1, at 701-02. 
93 Frank, supra note 1, at 708. 
94 Frank, supra note 1, at 708.  
95 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
96 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
97 See generally HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1.  See also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1982); Rollock, supra note 89, at 578. 
98 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 64-67. 
99 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 33. 
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lawyering for the situation.100  He embraced the view that the 
collective family interest was often in the best interests of the 
individuals and that lawyers should have the freedom to offer legal 
services to the family unit.101  The idea that each member of a family 
may need to hire a separate lawyer was completely antithetical to the 
interests of a family unit.102 
Professor Clyde Spillenger had a slightly less charitable view 
of Brandeis’ conception of lawyering.103  Spillenger’s historical work 
led him to conclude that Brandeis believed in imposing his views 
upon clients for their benefit.104  Brandeis’ independence and fidelity 
to other interests caused him to limit client voice.105  This more 
ambivalent view of Brandeis’ lawyering explains his representation 
of multiple clients through this prism of a controlling lawyer who 
imposed his views upon clients. 
The romanticized perspective of lawyering for the situation 
does offer an attractive explanation for what Brandeis did in his law 
practice.106  However, it is unlikely that he meant to create a different 
form of lawyering when he represented multiple clients.  Instead, he 
took his highly skilled legal mind and sought to address problems in a 
methodical way.  In my view, Brandeis believed that clients benefited 
when lawyers could offer their skills obtained as an attorney.  In my 
opinion, Brandeis’ actions on behalf of multiple clients was in 
response to client choice, and included a client decision to trust his 
judgment, as their attorney, in addressing a legal problem.   
Unfortunately, in today’s litigious climate, Model Rule 2.2 
had many interpretive issues107 and was ultimately removed by the 
ABA House of Delegates in 2002.108  The drafters placed many of the 
concepts from Rule 2.2 in the comments of the general conflicts of 
 
100 Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 
980 (1987).  Professor Shaffer has argued that the Warren family representation is a perfect 
illustration of Brandeis’ “pattern of thought (and of practice)” for implementing the counsel 
for the situation role. Id. (according to Shaffer, Brandeis rejected the notion of only 
representing individuals for the notion that lawyers can represent and value human 
harmony).   
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 981. 
103 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1449-51.  
104 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1509. 
105 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1449. 
106 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1502-04. 
107 See Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 771-85.  
108 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
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interest rule, which is Model Rule 1.7.109  By referring to multiple 
client representation in the comments to the general conflicts of 
interest rules, the drafters left open in the text of the rule for lawyers 
to continue to represent multiple clients in forming transactions and 
resolving disputes.  Clients continue to request one lawyer to 
represent multiple parties in forming a transaction or resolving a 
dispute.110  And, lawyers continue to offer services similar to the 
work that Brandeis offered his multiple clients.111  Brandeis brought 
collaborative representation of multiple clients into the forefront of 
the legal profession, and the profession continues to grapple with the 
proper manner to deliver such services. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF BRANDEIS TO THE 
MODERN LAW OF LAWYERING 
Without doubt, the charges leveled against Louis Brandeis in 
the confirmation hearings were motivated by political hatred, 
antisemitism, and economic protectionism.112  But this unsuccessful, 
yet illegitimate, attack may have had an unintended but significant 
influence upon the development of the law of lawyering.   
The Senate debate placed a focus upon the importance of 
ethical conduct for a leading lawyer under consideration for a seat on 
the bench of the United States Supreme Court at a time when the 
ABA and multiple states were adopting codes of conduct for 
attorneys.113  The ABA realized that the promulgation of codes of 
conduct was an important component of its quest for self-regulation 
of the legal profession.114  However, the debate over the conduct of a 
prominent lawyer in the public eye raised the stakes for those who 
were drafting ethics codes.  Ethics codes needed to provide lawyers 
with guidance on how to address conflicts of interest in transactional 
practice to avoid the types of allegations that were made against 
Louis Brandeis.  
The allegations were set in the context of conflicts of interest 
in non-litigation, which illustrated the difficulty of drafting codes to 
 
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
110 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 761. 
111 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 776, 778. 
112 Frank, supra note 1, at 683-84. 
113 Frank, supra note 1, at 685. 
114 See Abel, supra note 43, at 142 (examining the role of promulgating ethics codes in the 
quest for self- regulation).  
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address this area of legal ethics.  This obstacle may have contributed 
to the development of two different approaches to drafting ethics 
codes – those who sought to focus on aspirational guidelines and 
those who wanted more detailed guidance.115   
The confirmation hearings also illustrated the prevalence and 
importance of multiple client representation in business practice.  The 
inadequacy of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics to address 
Brandeis’ conduct further demonstrated the need for the bar 
regulators to pay closer attention to non-litigation practice.116   
Louis Brandeis introduced the concept of intermediation into 
the representation of multiple clients in transactions or dispute 
resolution.117  This type of law practice framed a century long debate 
involving client desire and independent lawyer judgment in resolving 
the legal issues in a group setting.  The debate over the proper role of 
a lawyer continues today and we still recount the ethical dilemmas 
faced by Louis Brandeis in his law practice.  The debate over the 
propriety of the conduct of Louis Brandeis has contributed 
significantly to shaping the modern law of lawyering. 
 
 
115 William T. Ellis & Billie J. Ellis, Beyond the Model Rules: Aristotle, Lincoln, and the 
Lawyer’s Aspirational Drive to an Ethical Practice, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 591, 597-98 
(2009). 
116 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 757-58. 
117 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 748-49. 
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